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THE NON-REVIEWABILITY PROBLEM
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
By WILLIAM H. TOWLE*
While judicial review of administrative action is generally
considered a fundamental aspect of our governmental system,
the prefatory language to Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act - the Section which establishes the right
and scope of judicial review of agency action - specifically limits
judicial review in the following language:
[E]xcept to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.'
This preclusion of review is not limited to the more esoteric
functions of the federal government. It touches such commonplace dealings as veteran's benefits, employment contracts and
housing.2 It is of concern to such disparate subjects as rate
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the determination of soil bank allotments. 3 The applicability of
these preclusion provisions is therefore of a general interest to
those dealing with the federal agencies.
The problem of non-reviewability may be best stated with
an example. The Interstate Commerce Act requires that carriers who change existing rates prove that 'the new rate is lawful. Persons adversely affected by the new rate may petition
the Interstate Commerce Commission for an investigation into
the new rate and a stay of its effectiveness until after the investigation. If the Commission disregards this request, the rate
becomes effective and the only recourse is to file a formal complaint with the Commission. In such formal proceedings the, burden of proof shifts--to-the complainanti and the consequence-of
* Instructor, The John Marshall Law School. Associated with the firm
of Singer and Hardman, Chicago, Illinois. LL.B., Harvard Law School
1959, A.B., University of Illinois 1954.
. ' Administrative Procedure Act §10, 5 U.S.C. §701 (Supp. III 1968).
The original language of Section 10 reads "Except so far as (1) statutes
preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion." Administrative Procedure Act §10, 5 U.S.C. §1009 (1964). In
1966 Congress codified the various provisions (if"Title 5, including the Administrative Procedure Act. Its purpose in effecting the change was to
restate without substantial change, the laws replaced by the new section.
2See, e.g., Chernock v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1966); Soderman v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 313 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963) ; Bridgeport Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 307 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
950 (1963) ; Ford v. United States, 230 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Alley v.
Craig, 97 F. Supp. 576 (D. Maine 1951).
s Caulfield v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217 (5th
Cir. 1961); Long Island R.R. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. N.Y.
1961).
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this shift and the delay until final determination, during which
time the rate is effective, may cause a substantial detriment
4
to the protesting party.
If the protesting party submits irrefutable evidence that
the proposed rate is unlawful and the carrier responds with
speculation and conjecture, the protestant will undoubtedly feel
aggrieved if the Commission allows the rate to become effective
while considering the Commission action capricious, arbitrary
and definitely unlawful. Even if such analysis of the pleadings
submitted to the Commission is correct, the complainant will
not be able to achieve judicial review since the decision is one
committed by law to agency discretion.5
On the other hand, if the determination were not within the
the ambit of the non-reviewability provisions of Section 10 of
the APA, then the established concepts of judicial review of administrative action would attach. These would normally include
judicial review of the record before the agency to see whether
the decision was supported by the whole record.6 An administrative decision would be required and analyzed by the court
to assure that a supportable bridge exists between the factual
determination and the expressed conclUsion.7 In short, the usual
safeguards to assure that agency action is kept within the intended bounds would be applied.8 Since, under the APA, the
application of these safeguards is stopped at the threshold of
review it is appropriate9 to consider the intent of Congress in
enacting this provision.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In determining the reach of the preclusion provision there
are few specifics in the way of statutory history to rely upon as
guides. The review provisions of Section 10 were intended to
"afford a remedy for every legal wrong."' 1 At the very outset,
4

For a more complete explanation of the Commission's suspension pro-

cedures see E. ANDERSON, ICC PRACTICE AND. PROCEDURE 101-07 (1966).

5 See text beginning after note 18 infra.
6 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
1951).
7 Stanislaus County v. United States, 193
F. upp. 145 (N.D. Cal.
1960).
8 See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320-27
(1965).
9It must of course be recognized that the statutory prescription of review is not the sole method of avoiding review on the merits. Such concepts as standing and sovereign immunity permit the courts to exercise some
selectivity in the matters to be reviewed. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S.
426 (1948); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). Furthermore, the
doctrine of non-reviewability itself predated the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320
U.S. 297 (1943).
10S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,251 (1946). "What the bill'does
may be summarized.

.

.

. It sets forth a simplified statement of ju-

dicial review designed to afford a remedy for every legal wrong, (sec."10)."
Id.
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however, this broad mandate was to be subject to the generally
recognized non-reviewability provisions.1 While the Congress
apparently proceeded on the assumption that the doctrine of nonreviewability was an established principle, there was an attempt
to define the proposed legislation in terms of the limits of Congressional acceptance and understanding of the doctrine.
A. Statutory Preclusionof Review
Where the statute precluded judicial review the Congress
was at pains to point out that the statute must either expressly
preclude review or the intent to do so must be clearly evidenced.
This position was clearly recognized in both the Senate and
House Committee Reports, with the following language from the
House Report stating this understanding:
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never
been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own
statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority
granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be
otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank
checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.
The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they relate
to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To
preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific
in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and
convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure
to provide specially by statute for judicial
review is certainly no
2
evidence of intent to withhold review.I
The implicit withholding of judicial review was adopted by Congress in response to the suggestion of the Attorney General. The
original Summers Bill has stated that review would be precluded
only where statutes "explicitly" so provided.L3 When this proposed
language was sent to the Attorney General for comment he cited
the (then recent) decision in Switchmen's Union of North
America v. National Mediation Board,1 4 to the effect that a
statute may in terms preclude judicial review or be interpreted
as manifesting a congressional intention to preclude judicial review. 15 The present language resulted from this suggestion.
In the debate before the House, Mr. Walter, Chairman of
the Subcommittee in charge of the bill, reiterated the understanding expressed in the Committee Reports in his explanation
of the legislation:

" The Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained the preclusionary
language as follows: "The introductory exceptions state the two present
general or basic situations in which judicial review is precluded - where
(1) the matter is discretionary or (2) statutes withhold judicial powers."
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1946).
12 The Report of the House Committee in the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1946). See also Senate Report of the Committee
on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1946).
13S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1946).
14320 U.S. 297 (1943).

15 Id. at 304-05.
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Two general exceptions are made in the introductory clause
of section 10. The first exempts all matters so far as statutes preclude judicial review. Congress has rarely done so. Legislative
intent to forbid judicial review must be, if not specific and in
terms, at least clear, convincing, and unmistakable under this bill.
The mere fact that Congress has not expressly provided for judicial
review would be completely immaterial. See Stark v. Wickard (321

U.S. 288 at p. 317).16
Congress was willing to accept the suggestion of the Attorney General that an implicit preclusion should, within the terms
of the Switchmen's case, be included in the statute. While Congress, by rewording its exclusionary language, did not overrule
the Switchmen's decision it certainly did not adopt a preference
for non-reviewability17 Instead, its message was that in those
cases where the statute is silent, review will be afforded unless a
contrary congressional intent is clear, convincing and unmistakable. The preference is for review and even in the amorphous

world of statutory construction, it should be difficult to interpret

the history of a particular statute to preclude review unless some
specific manifestation of such an +intent is present."'
B. Action Committed to Agency Discretion
The. legislative consideration of the second exception where agency action is committed to agency discretion - illus-

trates a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the scope of this
exception. According to the Senate Committee Report, discre-

tionary agency conduct would involve all of that which is not

confined by statutory standards or definitions:
The basic exception of matters committed to agency discretion
would apply even if not stated at the outset. If, for example,
statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to
I6 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1946).
The citation to
Stark v. Wickard, was to a case that followed Switchmen's by some six
months. While it did not overrule Switchmen's it did clearly state the principle 'that the courts have a responsibility' to define the limits of statutory
authority and resolve cases where individual rights are infringed by unauthorized administrative power, and while the statute specifically granted
review to one group (milk handlers) the Court did not construe that as
intent to preclude another and different group (milk producers) from obtaining judicial review.
17 Certainly affirming the principle of implied preclusion
in the Switchmen's case was a practical necessity in view of the many previously enacted
statutes concerning a multitude of different agencies and their different
powers. -The implied preclusion doctrine effectively dealt with these existing
statutes. However, instead of the formulation in Switchmen's, i.e., is the
intent of Congress "plain" 320 U.s. at 305, Congress intended to restrict the Switchmen's case 6 y the more stringent proofs required to invoke
an implied Congressional intent to preclude review.
is Congress can and has focused its intent and employed specific language such as that in the Federal Employees Compensation Act, where the
action of the Secretary in allowing or denying payment "shall be final and
conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact,
and not subject to review by any other official of the United States, or by
any court by mandamus or otherwise ....
" 5 U.S.C. §793 (1964).
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review. That situation cannot be remedied by an administrative
procedure act but must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administrative powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions, or other grants of power deny or require action
in given situations or confine an agency within limits as required
by the Constitution, then the determination of the facts does not
lie in agency discretion but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial record. 19
The following expression of legislative intent set forth in

the Senate Report seems only to indicate the obvious point that
no clear standards could be framed and the matter would be
left to the courts for their development:
Matters of discretion are necessarily exempted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect supercede agency
functioning. But that does not mean that questions of law properly presented are withdrawn from reviewing courts. Where laws
are so broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion, the
situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act
but must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administrative powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions,
or other grants of power deny or require action in given situations
or confine an agency within limits as required by the Constitution,
then the determination of the facts does not lie in agency discretion
but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial
record. In any case the existence of discretion does not prevent a
person from bringing a review action but merely prevents him
20
pro tanto from prevailing therein.

It is apparent from the foregoing explanation of the effect
and purpose of the discretionary preclusion that the framers of
the bill were unable to formulate the extent and reach of the
legislation. Broad provisions were to be redrafted, but such a
solution fails to deal with the specific instance where that broadly
phrased power is questioned in court with a concrete situation.
Similarly, a person is not prevented from bringing a review action, but will merely be prevented from prevailing "pro tanto".
That formulation provides little assistance to the courts in de-

termining when, in fact, the agencies argument that it is invested with exclusive discretion should preclude an analysis of

its specific exercise.
The apparent uncertainty concerning the reach of the provision caused the following colloquy in floor debate on the measure:
Mr. Donnell ....
It has occurred to me the contention might
be made by someone in undertaking to analyze this measure that
in any case in which discretion is committed to an agency, there
can be no judicial review of action taken by the agency. The point
to which I request the Senator to direct his attention is this: In
a case in which a person interested asserts that, although the
19 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1946).
20 Id. at 275.
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agency does have a discretion vested in it by law, nevertheless
there has been abuse of that discretion, is there any intention on the
part of the framers of this bill to preclude a person who claims
abuse of discretion from the right to have judicial review of the
action so taken by the agency?
Mr. McCarran. Mr. President, let me say, in answer to the
able Senator that the thought uppermost in presenting this bill is
that where an agency without authority or by caprice makes a
decision, then it is subject to review.
But in answer to the first part of the Senator's question namely, where a review is precluded by law - we do not interfere
with the statute, anywhere in this bill. Substantive law, law
enacted by statute by the Congress of the United States, granting
a review or denying a review is not interfered with by this bill.
We were not setting ourselves up to abrogate acts of Congress.
Mr. Donnell. But the mere fact that a statute may vest
discretion in an agency is not intended, by this bill, to preclude
a party in interest from having a review in the event he claims
there has been an abuse of that discretion. Is that correct?
Mr. McCarran. It must not be an arbitrary discretion. It
must be a judicial discretion; it must be a discretion based on
21
sound reasoning.
The final report on the bill was in accord with this colloquy,
where Mr. Walter, Chairman of the Subcommittee in charge of

the bill, reported to the House as follows:
The second general limitation on the section is that there are
exempted matters to the extent that they are by law committed to
the absolute discretion of administrative agencies. There have
[sic] been much misunderstanding and confusion of terms respecting the discretion of agencies. They do not have authority in
any case to act blindly or arbitrarily. They may not willfully act
or refuse to act. Although like trial courts they may determine
facts in the first instance and determine conflicting evidence, they
cannot act in disregard of or contrary to the evidence or without
evidence. They may not take affirmative or negative action without
the factual basis required by the laws under which they are proceeding. Of course, they may not proceed in disregard of the
22
Constitution, statutes, or other limitations recognized by law.
The statutory history indicates a troublesome concern on
the part of Congress as to the reach of agency discretion. It is
the more sustainable position that Congress intended a narrow
reading of this language. While review on the merits could be
precluded, the Congress was not forbidding the courts the threshold inquiry into whether the action was capricious or arbitrary.
II.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION -

DISCRETION

In almost all areas of administrative conduct there is some
degree of discretion given by Congress. This factor has created
certain doubts in the applicability of the discretionary preclusion
21
22

Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 368-69.
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and the courts are puzzled over the applicability of this provision.
An interesting illustration of their concern involves the Interstate Commerce Commission's statutory power to suspend a proposed rate pending an investigation into its lawfulness. Where
a request for suspension was made and the agency denied it,
the courts had, prior2 3to the APA, held that such action was not
judicially reviewable.
Reference to the APA was first made in Coastwise Line v.
United States,2 4 where the extent of the court's treatment of the
APA's effect upon reviewability of a Commission suspension order was to conclude that the APA did not increase the scope of
review. While the court did not examine the precise limits of
ICC discretion in denying a suspension request it noted that,
assuming it had jurisdiction to review an arbitrary and capricious denial, it found no such arbitrary and capricious action in
this case.
It was not until 1959 in Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United
States,2 1 that a court squarely faced the effect of Section 10 of
the APA upon the scope of Commission discretion and judicial
review of action taken pursuant to such discretion. The sole
question was whether the suspension provisions, Section 15(7),
of the Interstate Commerce Act committed to agency discretion
the decision to deny suspension petitions. The court rested its
conclusion that the statute did vest the Commission with discretionary authority upon: (1) the statutory history which was the
basis of Section 15 (7), namely, that diverse federal courts had,
in issuing injunctions against rate proposals, confounded the uniform administration of rates which was envisioned by the Interstate Commerce Act; and (2) the uniform judicial interpretation
of refusing to review the denial of suspension petitions.
The necessary finding was: "The court is constrained, therefore, to hold that the denial of a suspension of a rate by the Commission is by law committed to agency discretion and therefore
not reviewable. ' ' 26 The express language of Section 10 of the
APA removes the denial of suspension from the reviewing powers of the court. This occurs even if the denial of suspension
would be shown to be arbitrary or capricious, as the Luckenbach
court noted: "[I]t [the court] may not set aside arbitrary or
capricious action so far as agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion. So far as the action is by law committed to
2 E.g., M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry., 236 F. 573 (S.D. Ga.
1916), aff'd, 239 F. 718 (1917) and Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States,
11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
24 157 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
25 179 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959).
26 Id. at 610.
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agency discretion it is not reviewable - even for arbitrariness
27
or abuse of discretion.
That the full reach of the Luckenbach decision - no review
of even capricious agency action - was not wholly palatable was
28
evident in the case of Bison Steamship Corp. v. United States.
The court sought a way to avoid Luckenbach by concluding that
it was in conflict with another decision on the subject, Seatrain
Lines, Inc. v. United States.29 However, the court held that it had
no power to review this particular order, since there had been a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a formal
complaint under another section of the act, so that review at
this stage of the proceeding would disrupt the administrative
scheme. It was obvious that the court did not like the Luckenbach statement that judicial review is precluded even if the
Commission action were arbitrary and capricious.
Where the Commission does grant a request for suspension,
the courts have generally denied review but have not quite accepted the concept that the Commission has unbounded discretion in this matter. Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce
Act requires that reasons be given when a proposed rate is suspended.
In Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. United States,30 the Commission's order was attacked on the basis that insufficient reasons were given for suspension where the Board's statement was:
"That said schedules make certain reductions in rates . ..for
the transportation in interstate ... commerce ... in tank trucks
and that the rights and interests of the public would be injuriously affected thereby. ' 3 1 The three judge court rejected this
argument and sustained the dismissal by the single district
judge. However, the court was not disposed to embrace the
Commission's argument that the court was absolutely without
authority to review a Commission order, but instead stated:
[I]t is certainly true that the making of the orders is confided to
the discretion of the Commission, and that only upon the closest
27Id. at 609.

182 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
168 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. N.Y. 1958). However, a close reading of the
Seatrain case would indicate that the court was not on sound ground in
concluding there was a conflict between Luckenbach and Seatrain. In the
Seatrain litigation the issue before the Commission was an application for
Section 4 relief which the Commission granted over the opposition of Seatrain. Seatrain immediately brought suit to overturn the grant of the Section
4 relief and also to stay the effective date of the rate pending judicial determination. The court found- that- the Section 4-relief had been unlawfully
granted. It therefore had no trouble in taking the next step which was to
enjoin the rate pending remand to the Commission. This action, however,
is no more than what courts normally do in those instances where they review a final Commission Order and conclude for one reason or another that
the Commission has erred.
30 126 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Tex. 1954).
31 Id. at 589.
28
29
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and most compelling showing that discretion was not exercised
at all, or, if exercised, was abused, would a court interfere with
a suspension order; we think it clear that, considering the reason
given by the Commission in this case in the light of this compelling
principle, it cannot be said of it that it was no reason at all and
that the Commission, therefore, entered the order not in the exercise of its discretion and in compliance with the statute but
without
2
the exercise of discretion and in defiance of the statute.
The court held that it can review for abuse of discretion.
However, given the generalized formulation of the Commission's
reasons in this case it is difficult to perceive an instance where
such abuse of discretion could be found. The Commission merely
said that there was a proposed reduction and that the rights and
interests of the public would be injuriously affected thereby.
Another case concerning judicial review of a grant of sus33
pension is Consolidated Truck Service, Inc. V. United States.
In a somewhat confusing decision, the court held that the suspension order was not a final order but rather a proceeding committed by law to agency discretion and consequently Section 10
of the APA precluded review. However, the court specifically
declined to decide the question of whether an arbitrary and
capricious suspension order would be subject to judicial review,
stating that,
[T]he question of whether even an arbitrary and capricious suspension order in the present context is subject to judicial review
...has led to different opinions. [Citations omitted.] Suffice it
to say that without more proof it cannot be said that the action of
the Commission is arbitrary and capricious. Surely such a conclu34
sion must await the results of the hearing.
Thus, where the Commission either grants or denies the
request for suspension the courts have not allowed review, although they have refused to accept the proposition that an arbitrary use of discretion is not reviewable.
Amarillo-Borger Express, Inc. v. United States,'5 was the
first case which held that a Commission suspension order was reviewable. In this case the Suspension Board had issued one of
its standard orders saying that the rates would, if permitted to
become effective, be unjust and unreasonable in violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act and would constitute unfair and destructive competitive practices in contravention of the National
Transportation Policy. The reviewing Division of the Commission' vacated and set aside the suspension portion of this order,
giving the following reasons: "It further appearing, That consideration has. been given to petitions of the respondents request32

Id. at 591.
33193 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1960).
34

Id.

at 779.

35138 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
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ing vacation of the order of suspension, and to replies thereto,
and good cause appearing therefor [sic]."36
The court looked upon the long line of authority concerning
Commission grant and denial of suspension as follows:
The action we review is not the failure of the Commission to
suspend, nor are we confronted with the question of reviewability,
or extent thereof, of Commission action, taken with proper regard
to substantive and procedural requirements, declining to suspend
proposed rates, such as that involved in the cases pressed on us so
heavily by defendants .... 37

Instead the court analyzed Section 15(7) and its requirements
that the Commission state its reasons for suspension as constituting a statutory duty to adequately articulate the basis for
granting suspension so that the court may review the action
taken.
The reasons stated by the Suspension Board for granting
suspension were considered to be "decisive and significant in nature"38 and constituted findings. When the Division reversed,
on an order which merely stated "good cause appearing," the
court found a lack of basic or essential administrative findings
to negate the decisive and significant findings of the Board.
The court's conclusion relied upon the requirement of Section
8(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires an
agency to enunciate its findings supporting its order.3 9
As to whether the action of the Commission was discretionary, so as to have it fall within the prefatory provision of Section
10 of the APA and thereby not be subject to the findings requirement, the court, in an interesting construction of statutory
history, concluded that a discretionary judgment was the type
of action which the Congress intended to have reviewed and not
exempt from review by the language of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. -Once having left the hurdle of Seetion 10 upon finding that the -court had jurisdiction to review
a suspension order, at least to the extent of requiring the Commission to adequately state the underlying reasons for its action,
the court easily concluded that the "for good cause appearing"
order was not an adequate exposition of the Commission's findings and .conclusions. It, therefore, remanded the matter to
the Commission.
When the question was next raised in Long Island Railroad
Co. v. United States,40 two of the three judges agreed with Judge
Brown's decision in Amarillo-Borger. It is interesting to note
that while Judge Brown referred to the order of the Suspension
36 Id. at 415.
37 Id. at 416 n. 10.
98 Id. at 417.
39 5 U.S.C. §557 (Supp. III 1968).
40 140 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. N.Y. 1956).
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Board as one based upon decisive and significant findings made
under the statutory mandate, the majority in Long Island increased the force of the Board's action by stating: "In order
to invoke the power to suspend a tariff of rates asserted to contemplate an adverse effect against which the Interstate Commerce Act is thought to afford protection, the plaintiffs were required in effect to present a prima facie case to the Board of
'
Suspension.' 41

In this case, the Commission had initially reversed the Board
of Suspension with a "good cause appearing" order. However,
it substituted another order, nunc pro tunc, for its good cause
order, which merely negated the exact language of the order of
the Board of Suspension. This negation was not thought by the
court to constitute an adequate statement of the reasons supporting the Division reversal. It remanded to the Commission
for a fuller explanation.
Circuit Judge Swan dissented and categorically denied the
validity of the reasoning in Amarillo-Borger concerning the reviewability of action committed by statute to agency discretion. He noted that these decisions precluding reviewability of
discretionary acts long predate the APA and that the APA was
not designed to change the law. He argued that the language of
Section 10 precluded judicial review where, as in a suspension action, the matter was vested in the agency's discretion.
The first case to question the authority of Amarillo-Borger
was the second case of Long Island Railroad Co. v. United
States.42 This case represents the single instance of a court
considering a Division reversal of a denial of suspension. Judge
Friendly assessed the authority concerning reviewability of the
vacation of a suspension order, and stated:
The writer of this opinion must confess some difficulty in finding
satisfactory grounds for reconciling the decisions that the vacating
of a suspension order is reviewable even on the limited basis suggested in the cases so holding, with the generally accepted view
that a refusal to suspend is not (save perhaps when the latter rests
on an erroneous belief as to lack of power), see Swan, C.J., dissenting in Long Island R.R. Co. v. United States, supra, 140 F. Supp.
43
at page 828.
However, since the first Long Island case was the law in the

Eastern District of New York, Judge Friendly felt compelled
to follow that holding.
Having concluded that it had this jurisdiction to review,
the question then became one of the scope of review. In this
context the court noted the serious interference with effective
agency performance if it should require elaborate findings and
41

1d. at 828.

42 193 F. Supp.
4Id.
at 798.

795 (E.D. N.Y. 1961).

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

282

[Vol. 2:271

hearings in respect to the discretionary action taken on suspension matters. Consequently the court formulated the scope
of review into the proposition that "a suit to enjoin such an
order for lack of power may be entertained if, but only if, the
complaint shows that the suspension is plainly without statutory
4
authority or violates 'a clear statutory command,' . . .
Following hard on the heels of the second Long Island case
was FreeportSulphur Co. V. United States.45 In this case the suspension board had originally denied the petitions for suspension.
Division 2, acting as an appellate division, reversed and granted
suspension. Then on petition for reconsideration the Division
reversed and vacated the suspension order. In essence, this
is the same sort of problem which had, since Amarillo-Borger,
been decided in favor of the court having the power to review.
The court relied heavily upon Judge Friendly's exhaustive analysis of the cases in the second Long Island case and reached conclusions similar to his in respect to the status of the law respecting reviewability.
As to the question of the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act upon reviewability, the court concluded that the matter of granting or refusing suspension was "discretionary"
within the purview of Section 10 of the APA. However, the
court did not extend itself so far as to state that the court would
have no power to review an arbitrary or capricious action. Instead it took the position that "[a] ssuming that the Commission's
vacating order may be reviewed for abuse of discretion, we see
no abuse of discretion in its reconsideration of the suspension
4
order.'
47
In two recent cases, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States
and Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. United States, 8 the courts considered a Division vacation of a Board suspension order and concluded not to follow Amarillo-Borger. In the latter case, the
court noted the conflict between the Amarillo-Borger line of decisions and the second Long Islandcase decisions and specifically
declined to follow the position advocated by the Commission,
based on Luckenbach, that there is no judicial power to review suspension orders. Instead, the Naph-Sol court specifically aligned itself with Judge Friendly in his conclusion that
the reviewing court would have power to enjoin the Commission
order upon a showing that the suspension was without statutory
authority or violated a clear statutory command, and that the
complaining party had no other available remedy.
Id. at 800.
199 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
46 Id. at 916.
47 268 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
48 269 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
44
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In the Oscar Mayer case, the court, one judge concurring in
the result, 49 took the position that it had no jurisdiction to review
the suspension order, reasoning that Congress had vested the
Commission with sole and exclusive discretionary power to grant
or deny suspension. Thus, the court concluded that under Section 10 of the APA, the vesting of agency action to agency discretion precluded judicial review by its express terms, citing
Luckenbach.
The court did not leave the matter there, however, but assumed for discussion that it would have jurisdiction to examine
the statement of reasons listed by the Commission in support of
its order. In this respect the court compared Amarillo-Borger
and FreeportSulphur and concluded:
The vacation of a prior suspension order has the same effect [a
refusal to suspend rates for which reasons are not required] after
it has been entered as an initial refusal to suspend. It is difficult
to find justification for a requirement that a vacating order contain
the reasons for its entry when reasons are not necessary when the
Commission initially refuses to suspend rates. Freeport Sulphur
This Court is of the opinion that
Company v. United States .....
an order vacating suspension is not reviewable and rests wholly in
the discretion of the Commission.5"
It is readily apparent that courts are troubled with the
reach of a preclusion of judicial review. Some, arguendo, would
go so far as to preclude review even where the agency action is
predicated on a "corrupt" basis. Others would demand findings
and a reasonably drawn exercise of discretion which would prohibit judicial review. It would appear that regardless of the
ultimate conclusion with respect to any given area of discretionary power, a court should undertake the type of analysis
found in Luckenbach. The purpose of the discretionary grant
should be examined in light of the consequences of exercising review, but in no event should agency action which is clearly arbitrary or capricious be allowed to remain unreviewable. Such
was not the intent of Congress in enacting Section 10 and such
is not consonant with the proper function of the judiciary vis-avis the administrative process.
III.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION -

STATUTORY PRECLUSION

Where statutes have specifically precluded judicial review
the courts have generally honored the congressional mandate. In
4 Judge Doyle, concurring in the result, states his concept of review
as follows: "In my view, we should assert jurisdiction to review the procedure by which the Commission took the action complained of, but should
hold that the Commission was not required to state the reasons of basis for
its revocation of the suspension order." 268 F. Supp. at 984. The Judge
specifically recognizes that arbitrary or "even corrupt" reasons for suspension action by the Commission would not be reviewable. Id.
90 268 F. Supp. at 981.
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Caulfield v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,51 the statute
stated that the decision of the agency "shall be final and conclusive and shall .not be reviewable by any other officer or agency
of the government. '2 The court concluded that the APA affords no review where the particular statute denies it.
While such language is sufficient to preclude review, Congress can be quite specific in its preclusion of judicial inquiry.
This is evidenced by language in the Federal Employees Compensation Act, stating that the action of the Secretary in allowing or denying payment:
[S]hall be final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to
all questions of law and fact, and not subject to review by any other
official of the United States, or by any court by mandamus or
otherwise....

53

It should be noted that preclusion, such as the foregoing,
most often appears in areas where Congress has created rights
to federal funds. However, in areas of personal liberties the
preclusion of review does not readily find favor with the courts.
The tortured history of the deportation cases illustrates the difficulty of denying review of administrative orders in this area
of personal rights.
In Heikkila v. Barber,54 the Court held that a provision in
the Immigration Act of 1917 to the effect that the decision of
the Attorney General was "final" in deportation cases precludes
direct attack upon a deportation order by means of suits for
injunction or declaratory relief. Then in Shanghnessy v. Pedreiro,55 the Court went further into the legislative history underlying the Immigration Act and concluded that "final" referred
only to the administrative procedure rather than as a preclusion
of judicial review by injunctive and declarative relief. The Court
reasoned that since Congress had amended the statute after the
APA was in effect it must have realized that Section 10 would
only apply to express preclusions. Since they merely left the
word "final" in the statute without stating that there shall be
no judicial review, the intent must have been to permit review.
It is apparent that, in the area of personal liberties, the
courts are going to be more particular about the statutory language and purposes that will support a preclusion of judicial
review.
Since this is the case when Congress expressly at51293 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961).
at 219 n. 7.
52 Id.
53 5 U.S.C. §793 (1964).
54 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
55
349 U.S. 49 (1955).
5
6 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).

Compare Gentila

v. Pace, 193 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1951), with Harmon v. Brucher, 355 U.S.
579 (1958).
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tempts to limit review, the courts will certainly apply the same
analysis to an implied preclusion.
With respect to the area of implied prohibition of review,
Congress rather clearly said that such preclusion should only
be involved in cases where the intent of Congress was clear, convincing and unmistakable. The usual method of determining implied preclusion is the existence of specified review provisions
which impliedly preclude resort to others.
A recent case in this area is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,5 7 where the Court appeared to accept the Congressional understanding that implied preclusion be clear and unmistakable. In
this case the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, pursuant to a
1962 amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that
required manufacturers to label drugs with the established
name along with their trade name, promulgated regulations requiring the manufacturers to state the established name every
time that the trade name appeared. The drug industry asserted
that the Commissioner exceeded his authority by the regulation
which required the established name to appear "every time"
the trade name appeared.
The Court noted that the historical method of reviewing
regulations under the Food and Drug Act was by injunction,
seizure or criminal prosecution, all instituted by the Attorney
General. Review of the regulations could then be had in the
course of the proceeding instituted by the Attorney General-s
without allowing review prior to enforcement.
The Court then reviewed the statutory history of the Food
and Drug Act's review provisions and concluded that the preenforcement review was not prohibited. The Court refused to
investigate whether the sought-after review was within that
authorized by Congress, but instead determined whether it was
prohibited by Congress. It found nothing in the statutory history to indicate that Congress intended to preclude pre-enforcement review of formal agency action. 9 In fact, the Court concluded that " a study of the legislative history shows rather conclusively that the specific review provisions were designed to
give an additional remedy and not to cut down more traditional
'
60
channels of review.
57 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
58 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339
U.S. 594, 600-01 (1950);
Helko Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (1943).
59 The Helko case was distinguished as being an informal regulation.
The regulations involved in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 409
(1964), aff'd 364 F.2d 241 (1966) were characterized as tentative.
60 387 U.S. at 142. There was, however, sharp disagreement over the
interpretation of Congressional intent in Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion.
The three dissenters found instead that Congress had specifically considered
and rejected pre-enforcement remedies because of the overriding need for
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That the Court was taking a broad position with respect to
review is evident in its citing with approval the position of Professor Jaffee, that:
The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right
to review is too important to be excluded 61
on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.
The Court then stated the approach which must be taken in reviewing legislative intent, for the judiciary to "inquire whether
in the context of the entire legislative scheme the existence
of that circumscribed remedy evinces a congressional purpose to
'2
bar agency action not within its purview from judicial review. "
If in this case where there are compelling historical and policy
arguments for reading the statute to preclude pre-enforcement
judicial review, as the dissenting justices argued, it would appear that proving to a court that Congress impliedly intended to
preclude review will be most difficult.
CONCLUSION

Courts will not look with. favor upon the implied intent of
Congress to preclude review. The standard of clear and unmistakable evidence to prove such an intent will be most difficult
to sustain. This is a highly practical approach, since Congress
is well aware of the problem of review and should specifically
decide where it wants agency action to remain unreviewable.
Even where agency action is held to fall within the preclusion, either because of statutory direction or because of a
vested discretion, the courts must balance the need for review
in the particular instance with the policy determinations of the
objectives to be achieved by agency freedom.13 Courts, however,
should not withhold review where a reasonable showing of an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power is demonstrated. Congress did not intend such a result by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. The courts should not accept the
argument that they are precluded from examining proceedings
which do not attain those minimal standards.
prompt application of regulations dealing with matters of public health
which should not wait for their effectiveness until the matter can be litigated to conclusion. The majority recognized the public interest need and
held that the government could, in any request for pre-enforcement review,

show the public need, and "[ilt is scarcely to be doubted that a court would
refuse to postpone the effective date of an agency action if the Government
could show . . . that delay would be detrimental to the public health or
safety." Id. at 156.
01
62

Id. at 141.
Id.

63 For a consideration of the various policies and objectives to be
weighed and considered by the courts see Saferstein, Nonreviewability:
A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82 HARv. L.
REV. 367 (1968).

